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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: ALIVE AND WELL AFTER STOTTS
INTRODUCTION
America has long faced the problem of racial discrimination. Although
the Thirteenth Amendment banned all vestiges of slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude,' it was not until well into the Twentieth Century that the government
recognized that without some kind of affirmative efforts, blacks and other mi-
norities would be held back indefinitely by the lingering effects of their pre-
Civil War disabilities.' The Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 more than any other
piece of legislation in this century, helped rid this country of lawful, public dis-
crimination.
One of the most important sections of the Act is § 703(a) of Title VII.
This section prohibits employers from refusing to hire or promote any individ-
ual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Section 706(g)
provides the courts with broad power to remedy unlawful employment dis-
crimination .6
Before Congress passed the Act, some members were concerned with how
the remedies available under § 706(g) would affect established seniority plans.7
Since the remedies included reinstatement with the possibility of retroactive
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
'in 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt instituted a policy of nondiscriminatory employment and training in
the defense industry. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941).
'Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
'Section 703(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ((1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, col-
or, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1983).
5ld.
6Section 706(g) states:
If the court finds that the respondent had intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay . . .or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate ... No order of the
court shall require the admission or reinstatmeent of an individual as a member of a union, or the hir-
ing, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
'Senator Hill, chairman of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, feared that the Act would
"undermine the freedom of organized labor ... land] a basic fabric of unionism, the seniority system." 110
CONG. REC. 12, 486 (1964). See generally T. PARSONS. MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCiAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 346-58 (1947).
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seniority,8 some congressmen felt that Section 706(g) might destroy established
seniority plans in companies that violated the Act. To allay these fears, Con-
gress included § 703(h) in Title VII.9 Under § 703(h), actual discriminatory in-
tent must be shown for a seniority system to violate the Act. Under the general
employment discrimination provision, 703(h), only an unjustifiable
discriminatory impact needs to be shown to find a violation. 0 Under § 703(h),
even if a seniority system has a disproportionally adverse impact on minorities
or if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, the system is still a lawful,
bona fide plan."
The United States Supreme Court has had a very difficult time in deter-
mining the extent to which 703(h) protects seniority plans. Although 703(h)
makes it harder to prove that a seniority plan unlawfully discriminates, the ex-
tent to which seniority plans can be modified to remedy other unlawful
employment practices is not clear. To make the situation even more uncertain,
most Title VII claims end in either a collective bargaining agreement or a con-
sent decree,' 2 with no specific findings of unlawful discrimination.' 3 All too
often, these settlements have included an offer by the employer to implement
an affirmative action program, but have not clearly stipulated what would be
the seniority rights of those hired under the plan. 4
'See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9Section 703(h) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quantity of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administra-
tion or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensa-
tion paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provi-
sions of section 206(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
'""The Act proscribes not only overt discrimnation but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
"See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-56 (1977).
'
2Between 1972 and 1983, 88% of the Title VII suits instituted by the Justice Department resulted in con-
sent decrees. Schwarzschild, Public Law By Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of
Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894 [hereinafter cited as Public Law By Private Bar-
gain]. Many affirmative action programs are set out in collective bargaining agreements under threat of Ti-
tle VII litigation. See Cox, Some Thoughts On the Future of Remedial Race and Gender Preferences Under
Title VII, 19 VAL. U.L. REV. 801, 808 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Remedial Race and Gender Preferences].
"A consent decree is a settlement agreement. It is most often drafted by the parties themselves. It is con-
strued as a contract, but it is actually a court approved settlement and can be enforced by a contempt of
court citation. See EEOC v. Local Union No. 38, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1567, 1575 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
A collective bargaining agreement is a privately negotiated employment agreement where a bargaining
agent represents an uncoerced majority of the employees within the bargaining unit. JENKINS, LABOR LAW §
9.114 (1969).
"For a thorough explanation of the content and use of consent decrees in Title VII litigation, see Public Law
By Private Bargain, supra note 12 at 894-901.
[Vol. 19:3AKRON LAW REVIEW
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In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed the conflict between §§ 703(h) and
706(g) in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts. '5 In Stotts, the Court
held that a federal court could not modify a consent decree so as to prevent the
layoff of minority employees hired under an affirmative action plan where a
bona fide seniority system existed. 16 Although many considered Stotts to be the
beginning of the end for all affirmative action programs, 7 the Stotts holding
was probably quite limited. Stotts has not had a significant impact in most Ti-
tle VII cases before the lower federal courts. 8
This comment examines the current state of affirmative action in light of
the special protection that the Supreme Court grants seniority systems. This
comment also discusses the future of affirmative action and how the changes
in affirmative action will affect collective bargaining agreements and consent
decrees.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII
The phrase affirmative action means different things to different people.
To some, it refers to affirmative action measures as preferences; to others, as
reverse discrimination. 9 Affirmative action measures try to correct the effects
of past discriminatory injustices. However, in any affirmative action program,
innocent nonminority individuals are adversely affected. These individuals did
not participate in the past discrimination, but they nonetheless enjoy the
benefits of it. The Constitution and The Civil Rights Act afford the same pro-
tection from unjustifiable discrimination to these nonminority individuals as to
the minorities. 0 Therefore, an affirmative action, or reverse discrimination,
program must pass constitutional and statutory requirements.
In a trilogy of cases from 1978-1980, the Supreme Court attempted to
lefine the allowable limits for affirmative action plans. In these cases, Regents
)f the University of California v. Bakke,2 United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,2" and Fullilove v. Klutznick,23 members of the Court issued fifteen
'104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
"I-d.
'"See A Right Turn on Race?, 103 NEWSWEEK 29 (June 25, 1984); Quotas, Again-And Again, And Again....
37 NATIONAL REVIEW 14 (May 31, 1985); As Reagan Tries To Roll Back The Quotas, 98 U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT 12 (April 15, 1985).
"See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
'The labels are partisan in nature. See Remedial Race and Gender Preferences, supra note 12 at 801 n.1.
'Even the most neutral sounding principles... fail to prevent bias from intruding into the decision making
)rocess." Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J. 1041 (1985).
"The Equal Protection Clause binds states to provide equal protection to all. U.S. CONST. amend XIV (em-
)hasis added). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans public discrimination. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
1964) (codified as amended under various titles of U.S.C. (1976)).
1438 U.S. 265 (1978).
?443 US. 193 (1979).
1448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Winter, 19861 COMMENTS
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separate opinions of which only the majority opinion in Weber could muster as
many as five signatures." These cases present the basic constitutional and
statutory requirements facing affirmative action plans.
Bakke
In Bakke,25 the University of California at Davis medical school denied
admission to a white applicant, allegedly because of his race. The school had
established a special admissions policy that reserved sixteen spaces out of the
100 openings for minority students. Bakke alleged that he was denied admis-
sion because of the preference. The Supreme Court found that the school's
minorities admissions quota was improper.26 The Court stated that race could
not be the sole criteria for establishing an admissions quota without a judicial,
legislative, or administrative finding of past discrimination by the institution.27
The Court did state that race could be taken into account in a school's admis-
sions process, but it could not be the sole basis for an admissions decision.28
Even though the Court found the school's admissions policy to be im-
proper, it did not force the school to admit Bakke because he had not shown
that he would have been admitted but for the school's minority preferences.29
Although the case related to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the Court made
numerous references to Title VII30
Weber
In Weber,3 the Court considered its first reverse discrimination suit under
Title VII. The employer, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
(Kaiser), and the employees' union, the United Steelworkers of America,
entered into a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement covering terms
of employment at fifteen Kaiser plants. In order to eliminate obvious racial im-
balances at its plants,32 Kaiser agreed to institute a voluntary affirmative action
program whereby fifty percent of the openings in an in-plant craft training pro-
gram would be reserved for blacks until the percentage of Kaiser's black craft-
workers reflected the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Other than
2Nn Bakke, two opinions drew four signatures. Weber's majority opinion drew five signatures. In Fullilove,
no opinion drew more than three signatures.
25438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2bId. at 273.
271d. at 301.
"SId. at 317.
2The Davis medical school received 2,464 applications for the 1973 entering class and 3,737 applications for
the 1974 entering class. Id. at 274 n.2. Each entering class consisted of 100 students. Id. at 272.
Y'Id. at 283.
31443 U.S. 193 (1979).
"
2Because blacks had traditionally been excluded from craft unions, Kaiser employed few black craftworkers.
Id. at 198. Prior to 1974, only 1.83% of the skilled craftworkers at Kaiser's Gramercy plant were black,
although 39% of the local work force was black. Id. at 198-99.
[Vol. 19:3
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the fifty percent minority qualification, admissions to the training program
were made strictly on the basis of seniority."
Brian Weber, a white production worker, filed a class action suit challeng-
ing the affirmative action quota on the grounds that it violated Title Vii's ban
on employment discrimination. After both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit
upheld his claim, the Supreme Court reversed, finding in favor of the racial
quota plan? 4 The Court stated that Congress enacted Title VII to reverse the
effects of years of employment discrimination against minorities.35 Title VII
could not be construed to prohibit "race-conscious" quotas intended to break
traditional practices of discrimination. 6 The majority determined that a
"literal construction" of Title VII's ban on racial classifications would be con-
trary to the purpose of The Civil Rights Act. 7 In a two-pronged analysis, the
Court stated that Kaiser's affirmative action quota was permissible because 1)
"the purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute," and 2) "the plan does not
unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees."3
Kaiser's plan mirrored the purposes of Title VII in that it was intended to
help correct the "'plight of the negro in our economy""' of being "largely
relegated to 'unskilled and semi-skilled jobs."'0 Kaiser's plan also did not "un-
necessarily trammel the interests of white employees"'" because it did not re-
quire white employees to be fired in favor of black replacements, it did not ab-
solutely bar the advancement of white employees, and it was temporary in
nature. Although the Court did not set forth explicit guidelines by which to
judge voluntary affirmative action plans, the Court found the Kaiser plan to
be on the permissible side of Title Vii's general ban on racial classifications.42
"The seniority system was based on the length of time employed. See Kaiser, 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (1976).
"Weber, 443 U.S. 193.
'Id. at 202-04.
*Id. at 209.
'Id. at 201. It "would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial in-
ustice . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to
ibolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Id. at 204.
'Id. at 208.
'Id. at 205 (quoting I W CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)).
Did
Id. at 209.
?Some commentators have stated that the Weber and Bakke decisions cannot be reconciled because Weber
avolved Title VII and Bakke involved Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. B. S'HLEI AND P.
jROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 839 (1983); Abraham, Some Post-Bakke-and- Weber Reflec-
rons on "Reverse Discrimination. " 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (1980). Contra Boyd, Affirmative Action in
,mployment - The Weber Decision, 66 IowA L. REV. I passim (1980). However, as Justice Brennan's ma-
)rity opinion notes in Weber, the legislative history behind Titles VI and VII does not indicate that Con-
ress intended to bar the voluntary use of racial preferences to assist minorities to surmount the obstacles
.,nposed by the remnants of past discrimination. Weber, 443 U.S. at 215-16.
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Fullilove
In Fullilove4 the Public Works Employment Act required that at least
ten percent of all federally funded local public works projects must go to
minority business enterprises (MBE).44 Several non-MBE contractors chal-
lenged the preferences as violating the equal protection clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.45
The Court, again looking to its Title VII decisions,' determined that it
was well within Congress' power under the commerce clause to require such
preferences because there was abundant evidence from which it could con-
clude that minority businesses have been denied effective participation in
public contracting opportunities. 7 Here, Congress had the factual findings on
its side that the University of California did not have in Bakke. 8
The Court not only determined that Congress had sufficient reason for
the affirmative action plan, but that Congress' remedial measures were proper,
as well. Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court rejected "the contention
that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind'
fashion." 9 Burger noted that both the courts and Congress can incorporate
racial criteria into remedial decrees for statutory violations, such as Title VII
violations. Burger stated that just as race "must be considered in determining
whether a ... violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in for-
mulating a remedy."
Until 1980, affirmative action seemed to be alive and well. Although the
Supreme Court's opinions in Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove were fiercely divid-
ed,5' the lower courts read them as generally favoring affirmative action.5
After each case, commentators urged further liberalizations of affirmative ac-
"Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1977). A minority business enterprise must be (I) owned by a group of investors of
which at least 50% are minority group members, or (2) if a publicly owned corporation, owned by a group of
stockholders of which at least 51% are minority group members. Id.
4 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 493 n. 77.
"The Court relied on Franks, 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976) for the principle that Congress could prohibit prac-
tices that perpetuated the effects of not unlawful discrimination occurring prior to the Civil Rights Act.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484. The breach of federal anti-discrimination laws can also trigger race conscious
relief. Id.
'ld at 479.
'"n Bakke, the school made no findings of previous discrimination. 438 U.S. 265. In Fullilove, Congress
determined that there had been discrimination. 448 U.S. at 484. Justice Burger stated that the MBE provi-
sion of the Public Works Employment Act would "survive either test articulated in the Bakke opinions." 448
U.S. at 493.
"Bakke, 448 U.S. at 483.
11d. (quoting North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971)).
"See supra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982) (a
bargained for affirmative action plan that included a seniority override is permissible under Title VII); Sisco
v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982) (Title VII
[Vol. 19:3
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tion principles. 3 However, when these principles came into direct conflict with
the Court's strong backing of seniority systems, the Court made it clear that
court-ordered affirmative action could only go so far.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND SENIORITY PLANS
Congress provided the courts with broad remedial powers to provide "the
most complete relief possible" under § 706(g).54 Congress desired to restore in-
dividual victims of discrimination to the same positions they would have held
had they not been discriminated against." The courts, with Congress' ap-
proval, used § 706(g) to grant retroactive seniority, thereby interfering with
preexisting seniority plans.56 The courts justified this on the basis that 703(h)
only protected seniority plans from findings that they unlawfully
discriminated, not from modifications of them to remedy other discriminatory
acts of the employer. 7
The Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between § 706(g)'s broad
remedial provisions and § 703(h)'s protection of seniority plans in Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co.5" In Franks, a black truck driver filed a class ac-
tion suit against Bowman Transportation, alleging discriminatory hiring prac-
tices in violation of § 703(a). The district court found for the plaintiffs, but it
refused to order back pay or retroactive seniority for the members of the
class. 9 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of retroactive seniority on the
basis of § 703(h).0
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of retroactive seniority.' The
Court held that such an award was an appropriate judicial remedy since it
placed the individual victims in positions that they would have held but for the
unlawful discrimination.62 The Court read § 703(h) as being definitive in nature
permits employer-initiated seniority override even where not stipulated in negotiated affirmative action
plan); Setser v. Novask Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) (employer
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law once it shows its affirmative action plan was a remedial response to
a conspicuous racial imbalance, it was reasonably related to its remedial purpose, it did not unecessarily
trammel the interests of non-minority workers, it is not shown to be motivated by nonremedial reasons, and
it is not shown to unreasonably exceed its remedial purpose).
3See Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and Affirmative Action Principles In Labor Arbitration, and
Consequent Problems of Judicial Review, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 72 (1984).
1 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972) (memorandum by Senators Williams and Javits to interpret changes in
Title VII enforcement provisions).
"
5Section 706(g) of Title VII empowered the courts to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on account
of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
16See Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (discussing Congress' intent to allow use of retroactive seniority as a remedy
for actual victims of unlawful discrimination).
57E.g., Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324.
"
3Franks, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
91d. at 751.
"'Franks, 495 F.2d 398, 417 (1974), rev V in part, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
"Franks, 424 U.S. 747.
1d. at 779.
Winter, 19861 COMM ENTrS
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and not limiting the broad remedial provisions of § 706(g).6 3 The Court deter-
mined that although the remedy of retroactive seniority should only be award-
ed within a court's sound discretion, it was in line with Title Vii's purpose of
providing "make-whole" relief.64 The Court found that retroactive seniority
should not be withheld simply because it would conflict with the expectations
of innocent non-minority employees. The Court reasoned that the remedial ef-
fects of the award outweighed the burden on innocent nonminority
employees."
The Court again addressed the conflict between §§ 706(g) and 703(h) in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States66 in 1977. However,
the Court was presented with an issue in Teamsters that it had not been forced
to address in Franks: whether a seniority system violated Title VII by perpetu-
ating pre-Act discrimination? 67 The government challenged a trucking com-
pany's hiring practices and its seniority system on the grounds that they dis-
criminated against minorities .6 The district court found for the government on
both counts. 9 The court determined that since the company's seniority system
impeded the free transfer of minorities from one department to another, the
seniority system violated Title VII. The court of appeals affirmed.70
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, however. Although
the Court agreed that the company had unlawfully discriminated, 7 the Court
found that the seniority system that perpetuated the discriminatory effects was
protected by § 703(h).12 The Court stated that the seniority system was bona
fide since it was neutral on its face.73 The Court did remand the case to the
district court to determine which individual employees were discriminated
'lid. at 759.
Id. at 763.
611d. at 775.
-Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
671d. at 349.
"In Teamsters, the employer trucking company placed those minority members of its work force in the
"lower paying, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers" rather than the higher paying, long-
distance hauling jobs. Id. at 329.
o-ld. at 333.
'UTeamsters, 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
11 Teamsters. 431 U.S. at 369.
121d. at 372.
'd. at 355. The Fifth Circuit, relying on Teamsters, adopted a four-part test in James v. Stockham Valves
and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), to determine whether a seniority system was bona fide. The
four factors are:
I1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees equally from transferring be-
tween seniority units;
2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining units (if the latter, whether that
structure is rational and in conformance with industry practice);
3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination; and
4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.
Id. at 352.
JVol. 19:3
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against because awards of retroactive seniority would be appropriate remedies
for them.7"
In Teamsters, the Court maintained its protective stance over seniority
systems, but it also allowed retroactive awards of seniority for actual victims of
discrimination.75 The Court affirmed this position later in Pullman-Standard v.
Swint.76 In Pullman, the Court stated that "discriminatory intent.., means ac-
tual motive.., not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing
less than actual motive.""
The Court took its Teamsters holding one step further in American
Tobacco Company v. Patterson.7" In American Tobacco, the Court held that
seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of post-Act discrimination are
nonetheless bona fide. The Court firmly established that in order to attack
employment discrimination, the primary source of the discrimination had to be
attacked, not the seniority system that merely perpetuated its effects. The
Court reiterated that only identified victims of discrimination could receive
court-ordered "make-whole" relief."
These cases illustrate the progression of both affirmative action and the
remedial measures available under 706(g) as restricted by 703(h). In Bakke,
Weber, and Fullilove, the Court approved of the use of affirmative action
plans where unlawful discrimination was found by a competent fact-finding
body. 0 The Court approved of these plans even up to the use of racial quotas
to counter the effects of past discrimination. In Franks, the Court found that
retroactive seniority is an appropriate remedy for actual victims of intentional
discrimination.' Although the Court allowed modification of seniority plans to
remedy past discrimination, it stood firmly behind seniority systems in
Teamsters by allowing seniority systems to perpetuate past legal discrimina-
7 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 372.
7 Section 703(j) of Title VII states that employers may not be forced to grant preferential treatment on ac-
count of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin because of racial imbalances which may exist between
any given populations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20j) (1982). In Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638,
501 F.2d 622, 630 (2d Cir. 1974), the Supreme Court held that § 7031j) does not bar a court from ordering af-
firmative relief when actual discrimination is shown, even if it is based primarily on an imbalance between
the percentage of minority employees and the percentage of minorities in the local labor pool. Section 703j)
bars coercive relief only when racial imbalances are not caused by discrimination. Id. at 63 1.
7
1Pullman, 456 U.S. 273 (1980).
1
7Id at 289-90.
JsPullman, 456 U.S. 63 (1982). See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
79See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"0The courts have accepted findings of prior discrimination by a wide variety of bodies. See, e.g., Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981) (city's finding
of its own past discrimination satisfactory); Maehren v. City of Seattle, 599 P.2d 1255 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (198 1) (actions by Mayor and City Council recognizing past discriminatory
hiring practices sufficient to support racial hiring quota); cf Associated Gen. Contractors of California v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980) (local board
of education could not institute a minority business set-aside plan on its own finding of prior discrimination).
" See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
COMMENISWinter, 19861
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tion if the seniority plan did not intentionally discriminate. 2 The Court fur-
thered this principle in American Tobacco by protecting a seniority plan that
perpetuated the effects of past illegal discrimination. 3
These lines of cases show the conflict between the Court's interpretation
of §§ 706(g) and 703(h). The Court has generally expanded the remedies
available for Title VII violations, but it has also expanded its protection of
seniority systems. The conflicting goals of defeating the effects of discrimina-
tion and of protecting the interests of innocent non-minority employees came
to a head in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts.14
The Stotts Decision
In 1974, the Justice Department filed suit against the city of Memphis
alleging that the city had engaged in racial and sexual employment discrimina-
tion.8" In a consent decree between the parties, the city denied any discrimina-
tion but agreed to institute an affirmative action program that included a hir-
ing quota for minorities.86 This 1974 consent decree specified that the city's
seniority system would remain in effect and would apply to all new minority
employees. The decree did not stipulate any special contingencies in the event
layoffs occurred.
In 1977, Carl Stotts, a black firefighter, filed a class action suit alleging
that the city still followed racially discriminatory hiring and promotion prac-
tices. 8 In a 1980 consent decree between the parties, 9 the city again denied
any unlawful practices but agreed to institute a promotion quota in addition to
its hiring quota. 9 The city also agreed to make certain individual promotions,
with back pay but without any awards of retroactive seniority. 91 The 1980
decree also neglected to clarify what affect these actions would have in the
event of layoffs.
In May, 1981, the city was forced, for the first time in its history, to lay
off city employees because of budget deficits. 92 Since the layoffs would have
"virtually destroyed" 93 the progress made by the hiring goals in the consent
2See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
83See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
-104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
"Id. at 2581.
8
'Id. Although no findings of fact were stipulated in the decree, the city agreed that 50% of its new hirings
would be made from minority applicants. Id.
871d.
"
3Stotts' action was joined by another black firefighter, Fred Jones, in 1979. Id.
9The 1980 consent decree was explicitly entered into to avoid the delay and cost of litigation. Id.
iln the promotion quota, the city agreed to attempt to reserve 20% of all promotions for blacks. Id.
"Id.
"
2Stotts, 679 F.2d 541, 549 (1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
91d. at 561.
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decrees, the district court issued a temporary restraining order that prevented
the city from laying off any minority firefighters." A preliminary injunction
was then issued by the district court, enjoining the city from decreasing the
percentage of blacks in certain areas within the fire department by the
layoffs.95 The district court found that it possessed the authority to make these
orders because 1) the city's seniority system was not bona fide and 2) the 1980
decree specifically allowed the court to modify the decree. 96
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had acted
properly in modifying the consent decree although the Sixth Circuit reversed
the lower court's finding that the city's seniority System was not bona fide.97
The court of appeals found that the seniority system itself had no
discriminatory purpose and that the layoffs were not adopted with a
discriminatory purpose.98 The court did find, however, that the district court
had the authority under the consent decree to make the modification in order
to enforce the terms of the decree. 99 The court also found that the unexpected
economic crisis constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a
modification of the decree."°
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. 0' After asserting jurisdic-
tion, the Court found that the trial court had exceeded its authority in entering
its injunction. 02 In rebutting the court of appeals' justifications for the injunc-
tion, the Court noted that "the scope of a consent decree must be discerned
within its four corners."'0 3 The Court, again emphasizing the importance of se-
14ld. at 549.
151d. at 551.
6The court reasoned that since the proposed layoffs would have a discriminatory effect, the seniority system
was not bona fide. Id.
97Id. at 551 n. 6.
"Id.
"'Id. at 561-62.
100Jd. at 563. Since a consent decree is a court order, it can be modified by the court in order "to affectuate
the basic purpose of the decree." United States v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23 (1959). A consent decree
can be modified over objection of a party, but a hearing is required and a finding that there are changed cir-
cumstances. See id.
"'Stotts 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
"
2Before reaching the Title VII issue, the Court determined that there was an actual controversy before it as
was required by Article Ill of the Constitution. Id. at 2583-85. The respondents asserted that since all the
firefighters that were laid-off had returned to work, there was currently no controversy. Id. at 2584. The
Court stated that a controversy lingered on because the district court's injunction was still in effect, the
modification of the consent decree was still in force, and some employees possibly still had back pay claims.
Id. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion was "wholly advisory" because their ruling
would not affect the interests of the parties involved. Id. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun contended that the preliminary injunction had ended because the laid-off workers had been
rehired and the decree's modifications ended with the injunction. Further, the laid-off firefighters may have
back pay claims against the city. The city and the laid-off firefighters were both petitioners in the action, not
adversaries, so the back pay issue would be moot. Id. at 2598. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
noted that collateral effects of the layoffs remained since blacks had gained extra seniority rights by not hav-
ing been laid off. Id. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"o3Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Armour and Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971)).
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niority plans to American labor, stated that unless the decree specifically au-
thorized the contravention of the seniority plan, the district court could not
prevent the city from following its seniority plan to determine who to layoff."°
Although the district court had retained the power to make further orders as
necessary to "effectuate the purposes of the decree,' ' 10s the Court found that
one of the implied purposes of the decree was to maintain the city's seniority
plan. 06
The Court also found that there were no changed circumstances justify-
ing modification.107 Although four justices disagreed with the majority, 8 the
majority looked to Title VII to determine whether the district court could
modify the consent decree in the face of changed circumstances. The Court
stated that the authority to adopt consent decrees comes only from "the statute
which the decree is intended to enforce."' 9 Therefore, when a court seeks to
modify a decree from outside any authority granted by the decree and one of
the parties objects, the court must look to the statute to see if the modification
is consistent with the purposes of the statute. The Court determined that since
§ 703(h) protects bona fide seniority plans, the district court could not enjoin
minority layoffs based on § 703(a)'s general purpose of promoting minority
employment."0 The effect would be the same as granting constructive seniority
for someone who was not an actual victim of discrimination.
The Court's opinion in Stotts has been highly criticized."' Some have
stated that the Court's discussion of Title VII was pure dicta while others have
called the Court's opinion merely advisory."' In any event, the Court clearly
wanted to reach the result it did. The Court had to bypass three ways by which
it could have affirmed the lower courts' holdings. First, the Court could have
found there to be no case in controversy since Memphis had recalled all of its
laid off firefighters."' Second, the Court could have easily found that the 1980
1w]d.
'uId. at 2605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"IId. at 2588.
107Id
'"Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but stated that the Court's discussion of Title VII was simply
advisory. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'Old. at 2587 n.9 (quoting System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961)).
"'Although the plaintiff in Stotts was unable to obtain relief, plaintiffs generally bear a lighter burden than
defendants in seeking modification of a consent decree. Paridise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1527 n.13
(1985).
"'See, e.g., Note, Has the Supreme Court Put Out the Fire on Court Ordered Affirmative Action?:
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 737, 768 (1985);
Note, "Last Hired, First Fired" - Rights Without Remedies: Firefighters v. Stotts, 1985 DET. C.L. REV.
215 [hereinafter cited Last Hired, First Fired); Krauthammer, A Defense of Quotas, 193 NEw REPUBLIC 9
(September 16, 1985).
"'See Last Hired, First Fired, supra note 110.
"'Many commentators agree with Justice Blackmun that there was no case or controversy. See Spann, Sim-
ple Justice. 73 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1049 (1985). For a discussion of the Article III case or controversy require-
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decree authorized the district court to make the modification since the layoffs
had such an adverse impact to the decree's goal of balanced minority employ-
ment. Third, the Court could have allowed the modification under the theory
that it served to effectuate the basic purpose of the initial consent decree. The
initial decree's most obvious purpose was to increase the percentage of
minorities employed by the city in order to better reflect the percentage of
minorities in the local labor pool. The Court had to strain to find that the
decree placed strict compliance with the city's seniority plan ahead of trying to
eliminate the effects of past discriminatory employment practices. The Court
went further in Stotts then it had ever gone before in order to protect the sanc-
tity of a bona fide seniority plan.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER STOTTrS
Many authorities felt that Stotts represented a retreat by the Court from
affirmative action principles." 4 After Stotts, the chief of the Justice Depart-
ment's civil rights division, William Bradford Reynolds, urged all fifty states to
dismantle their affirmative action programs."' Reynolds insisted that affir-
mative action had done more harm than good." 6 Even the head of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Fred Alvarez, backed off pursuing
class-wide suits and began concentrating on individual suits."7 Many in Presi-
dent Reagan's administration feel that Stotts has effectively, even though not
explicitly, overruled Weber's allowance of voluntary, private affirmative ac-
tion programs based on mere conspicuous racial imbalances rather than
judicial findings of discrimination."'
The lower courts have not read Stotts so broadly, however. Arguably,
Stotts stands for only two propositions: first, that unless a bona fide seniority
plan is expressly overridden in a consent decree, principles of contract law do
not allow changes to be made in the seniority plan; and second, that a court
cannot modify a consent decree to adversely affect a seniority system where
there has been no finding of intentional discrimination and one of the parties
objects to the modification. Most circuit courts have limited Stotts to these two
propositions and have generally continued to follow Weber's guidelines.
ment, see Spann, Expository Justice, U. PA. L. REV. 585, 617-32 (1983); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofAr-
ticle III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Tushnet,
The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980).
"'Thomas, Assault on Affirmative Action, 125 TIME 19-20 (February 25, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Assault
on Affirmative Actionl; Press and McDaniel, A Right Turn on Race 103 NEWSWEEK 29-30 (June 25,
1985).
"'Assault on Affirmative Action, supra note 114.
"'Starr, McDaniel, and King, Attacking Affirmative Action, 105 NEWSWEEK 39 (May 13, 1985).
"'Assault on Affirmative Action, supra note 114. The Justice Department primarily litigates claims against
governmental bodies while the EEOC litigates claims against private actors. See B. SCHLEI AND P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1138, 1176 (1983).
"'Labor Secretary William E. Brock is one of the few members of the Reagan administration who supports
the continued use of affirmative action preferences. Dwyer, Brock Wins By Losing On Affirmative Action.
Bus. WK. 49 (September 23, 1985).
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In Deveraux v. Geary,"9 the First Circuit examined the extent to which
Stotts affected Weber and affirmative action. In Deveraux, five white, male
police officers challenged the promotion of a black officer on the grounds that
they had scored higher on a promotion eligibility exam. The black officer had
been promoted rather than one of the white officers because of a minority hir-
ing quota established pursuant to a consent decree in Title VII litigation. The
white officers alleged that Stotts had so changed the law of Title VII that the
consent decree could no longer stand because it violated the purpose of the
statute it was designed to enforce. The First Circuit distinguished Stotts by
noting that in Deveraux, 1) no modification of a consent decree over objection
was involved, 2) no bona fide seniority system was involved, 3) the parties
stipulated in the consent decree that patterns and practices existed that would
support a Title VII action. 2° The court noted that it was "not easy to deter-
mine from the plurality opinion in Stotts just how far a majority of the Court
would want to go in the present situation." 12' The court stated, however, that
had the Supreme Court intended to overrule Weber, it would have done so. In
analogizing Stotts to Deveraux, the First Circuit found that the plaintiffs had
sought "too broad a rule from too narrow a set of facts.' 2
In Kromnick v. School District of Philadelphia,"I the Third Circuit
reversed a district court's determination that a teacher assignment policy
violated Title VII. The policy required that the racial proportion of teachers in
any of the city's schools be within 75% to 125% of the average proportion for
all of the schools combined. If the racial mix of teachers at any given school
was not within this ratio, teachers were reassigned. The Second Circuit held
that Title VII permitted such a racial quota because 1) there had been a suffi-
cient finding of prior discrimination, 2) no white teachers were laid off by the
quota policy, 3) the teachers' seniority rights were not affected, and 4) the
measure was presumably temporary even though its length of duration had
not been specified. 2 4
In Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland,'25 the Sixth Circuit
upheld a proposed consent decree that incorporated racial hiring and promo-
tion quotas. The Vanguards association, a group of minority firefighters, in-
stituted the initial Title VII action against Cleveland. The firefighters' union,
Local 93, intervened and objected to the proposed consent decree between the
plaintiffs and the city because of the quotas. The district court approved of the
"'765 F.2d 268 (1985).
120id.
11id. at 274.
1221d. at 271.
"Kromick, 739 F.2d 894 (1984).
124d.
'753 F.2d 479 (1985).
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decree, nonetheless. The Sixth Circuit upheld the use of the quotas because 1)
the city admitted to past discrimination, 2) the firefighters' seniority system
would expressly not be affected, and 3) the consent decree was essentially
voluntary. 2 The court relied rather heavily on Weber and described Stotts has
having "no effect on this case."'2 7
In Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 2 the Seventh Circuit
addressed a situation quite similar to Stotts. In Britton, the school district and
the teachers union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement. As part of the
agreement, which was approved of by a majority of the teachers union, the
school district agreed to institute an affirmative action program. The agree-
ment explicitly stated that no minority teacher would be affected in the event
of layoffs. When layoffs ensured, white teachers, who were laid off but who
had more seniority than retained black teachers, filed suit challenging the
layoff procedures. In upholding the agreement, the Seventh Circuit noted that
1) the no-layoff provision was essential and crucial to the achievement of the
collective bargaining agreement's affirmative action objectives, 2) the agree-
ment did not require that unqualified teachers be retained, 3) the agreement
did not invidiously trammel the interests of white teachers, 4) the measure was
temporary, and 5) the measure was not designed to maintain a particular racial
balance.'29 Of great importance to the court was that the predominantly white
teachers union approved of the plan. The court found it extremely hard to
believe that the plan invidiously trammelled interests of the white teachers,
since the white teachers had voluntarily agreed to the plan in the collective
bargaining process. 30
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,'3 a reverse
sex discrimination case, the Ninth Circuit upheld an affirmative action plan
that was based on a simple showing that of over 238 craftworkers employed by
the agency, none were women. The court stated that "a plethora of proof is
hardly necessary," in light of such statistics, to show discrimination.'
In Paradise v. Prescott, " and in Turner v. Orr,' the Eleventh Circuit
11ld. at 489. The consent decree in Stotts had essentially been coercive. Id. at n.10.
11ld. at 486. The Sixth Circuit also upheld affirmative action plans in Wygant v. Bd. of Education, 746 F.2d
1152 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (plan to hire teachers so that the racial mix of minority
teachers would reflect the student racial mix) and Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43 (1984) (temporary plan
to hire greater percentage of blacks than were present in local labor pool was upheld because blacks had been
victims of years of discrimination).
1-775 F.2d 794 (1985).
111d. at 812-13.
130Id.
"'778 F.2d 1308 (1984).
111d. at 1313.
"3767 F.2d 1514 (1985).
13759 F.2d 817 (1985).
COMMENTSWinter, 19861
15
Conrad: Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
distinguished Stotts in that the consent decrees in Paradise and in Turner were
both premised on findings of actual discrimination. The court also stated in
Turner that "Stotts must be read in light of ... Weber. "135
In each of these cases, the circuit courts have read Stotts as narrowly as
possible. Had they read it broadly, the courts would have had to turn their
backs on a great amount of case law approving of affirmative action programs.
As the First Circuit stated in Deveraux, "this hardly seems [to be] the moment
for us to strike out in a new direction." 13 6 This has also been the reaction of
most employers when urged by members of the Reagan administration to
dump their affirmative action plans.'37 Affirmative action principles have been
too widely accepted and approved of to be abandoned.' Not only have com-
panies and governmental entities found employment discrimination suits cost-
ly, but instituting affirmative action plans has been costly, as well. Employers
realize that the executive branch of the federal government is out of touch
with the American public and that the next administration will probably
reinstitute the affirmative action policies of recent administrations.'39
Wygant: the Next Step
The Supreme Court will soon have cause to review affirmative action
principles when it decides Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education." In
Wygant, the Court will have the opportunity to not only address Stotts and
Weber, but the circuit court cases as well. In Wygant, a teachers union and
local school district entered into a collective bargaining agreement that em-
bodied an affirmative action program. The agreement stated that in the event
of layoffs, the percentage of minority teachers would not be decreased by the
layoffs. When layoffs occurred, non-minority teachers filed a Title VII and
equal protection suit. The district court and the Sixth Circuit found that the af-
11'ld. at 825.
"',765 F.2d at 275.
"'Thomas Hunt, an employment discrimination attorney in Los Angeles, estimated that 60% of the na-
tional companies in the United States used affirmative action goals and timetables. Assault on Affirmative
Action, supra note 114. Hunt knows of no company that has abandoned its affirmative action plan since
Reagan came into office. Id. In a recent survey, 95 percent of 128 of the nation's biggest companies stated
that they would continue to use hiring-and-promotion goals even if the government stopped requiring them.
Gest, Why Drive on Job Bias is Still Going Strong, 98 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. 67 (June 17, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Drive on Job Bias].
"'Eleanor Holmes Norton, a former head of the EEOC, states that affirmative action is so well entrenched
that "there would be a real moral problem if companies jumped on the Reagan bandwagon," Drive on Job
Bias, supra note 137.
"'in 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation). This
order, as amended, requires that all nonexempt federal government contracts contain provisions that impose
dual duties on contractors and subcontractors: not to discriminate against employees or applicants because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to take affirmative action to insure that applicants and
employees are employed without regard to such factors. 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation). All
presidents since Johnson have continued to support Executive Order 11246, but President Reagan's advisors
are pushing for a new amendment to the order that would prohibit the use of quotas in affirmative action
plans. Civil Rights: No More Quotas? 106 NEWSWEEK 21 (August 26, 1985).
"-746 F.2d 1152 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
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firmative action plan was proper even though it was based on a finding that
there was a racial imbalance between the percentage of minority teachers and
the percentage of minority students in the system.
The court of appeals stated that it was appropriate to make such a com-
parison because of the special relationship teachers have with students and
that "societal discrimination has often deprived minority schoolchildren of
other role-models."'' Therefore, the court determined, minorities were
substantially underrepresented as teachers.
Wygant will force the Court to look at issues it refused to address in Web-
er: to what extent are findings of discrimination necessary to institute a volun-
tary affirmative action program under a collective bargaining agreement? As
Weber stated, Title VII does not prohibit a private employer from adopting an
affirmative action program "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories.t42 In Weber, the past discrimination
was evidenced first by the disparity between the percent of blacks in the
employer's work force and the percent of blacks in the local community. The
Court also stated that "judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial
grounds are so numerous [that they are] a proper subject for judicial notice."' 43
The Court has often recognized that population/work force comparisons
are useful and sometimes sufficient to establish proof of past discrimination.'"
However, the disparities in those cases strongly evidenced actual discrimina-
tion against minorities. The statistics in those cases compared the percentages
of the class in one population with the percentages in another population. In
Wygant, the Sixth Circuit compared the percentages of one class in one
population to the percentages of another class in another population. This type
of comparison is theoretically unsound and illogical to show discrimination
against one class.'45 The Court will probably not condone the Sixth Circuit's
loose application of statistics to show employment discrimination.
In making the comparisons, the Sixth Circuit was explicitly considering
the needs of the minority students and the impact of the employment
discrimination on the students, not on the teachers. Although the court found
that minority teachers were substantially underrepresented, it failed to express
1111d. at 1156.
" Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
"'Id. at 199 n.I.
'"Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (population/work force statistics are suffi-
cient to establish prima facia case of employment discrimination, but more finely tuned statistical com-
parisons may be more probative).
M'As Justice Stewart stated for the majority in Hazelwood, "There can be no doubt ... that the District
Court's comparison of Hazelwood's teacher work force to its student population fundamentally miscon-
ceived the role of statistics in employment discrimination cases ... (A) proper comparison was between the
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant labor market." Id. at 309.
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why. The court refused to address the issue of "whether the District Court
properly utilized a minority student ratio.""' As Judge Wellford stated in his
concurring opinion, "students ... do not have a constitutional right to ... a
teaching staff of any particular composition." '47
The Court should not overrule the Sixth Circuit's decision, however.
Although the needs of the minority students should not be significant in the
employment discrimination context, the percentages of minority students at
the school could suffice to show the racial mix of the local labor pool.
Although long-term population patterns cannot be shown with great accuracy
from only a few years of evidence, as of 1971, the percentage of minority facul-
ty members was only eight and one-half percent while the percentage of
minority pupils was fifteen and nine-tenths percent. As recently as 1953, the
school district employed no black teachers; in 1961, only one and eight-tenths
percent were minority. The Court could easily find that the teaching profes-
sion has been a traditionally segregated profession' 8 and that a disparity ex-
isted between the percentage of minorities and the local labor pool and the
percentage of minorities employed as teachers. Such a finding would be consis-
tent with the Court's finding of past discrimination in Weber.1'9
THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS IN CONSENT DECREES AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Stotts has clearly had little effect on the lower courts' acceptance of either
voluntary or court-ordered affirmative action remedies. Stotts did not limit the
circumstances under which Title VII suits could be filed. Employers will un-
doubtedly still face the same Title VII alternatives in the future: lengthy litiga-
tion verses settlement in the form of either strictly voluntary affirmative action
plans, as part of a collective bargaining agreements, or in consent decrees.
Also, Stotts did not limit Weber's approval of voluntary affirmative action
plans designed to reverse racial segregation without trammelling the interests
of non-minority individuals.
In the future, when actual or potential plaintiffs agree to waive their Title
VII rights in a consent decree or collective bargaining agreement, they should
make sure that the agreement is very thorough. The basis for the affirmative
action plan should be clear. This may require extensive findings concerning
1'1746 F.2d at 1156 n.l.
"'Id. at 1159-60 (Wellford, J., concurring) (quoting Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Education, 705 F.2d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 1985)).
r'aThe Court made such a finding in Weber concerning racial discrimination in craft unions: "judicial find-
ings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject
of judicial notice." 443 U.S. at n.l. The Court relied on judicial notice to support a finding of prior
discrimination, thereby justifying the affirmative action quota. The Court could use the same analysis in
Wygant, especially since public schools in the United States have traditionally been segregated as to both
students and teachers. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49443 U.S. at 199 n.1.
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prior discrimination and the current effects of such discrimination. 1 If popula-
tion comparisons are used, they should be relative to the class seeking the
preference. The plans should not rely on statistics alone, however. They may
utilize other indicia of discrimination, such as the use of tests,' evidence of
traditional discrimination in the job classification, or the requirement of a high
school diploma. The best support for an affirmative action plan would prob-
ably be testimony from others who were actually discriminated against by the
employer or an admission of discrimination by the employer. Such evidence is
seldom easy to obtain.'
The cost of such extensive findings may deter some plaintiffs from even
filing Title VII suits. In light of the cost, however, some employers may also be
more willing to make concessions in order to avoid further Title VII expense.
Section 706(k) allows courts to award legal fees to prevailing parties. "
Therefore, the requirement of more extensive findings should not deter bona
fide Title VII claims.
The extent to which findings of discrimination are required after Stotts
and Wygant will still probably not parallel that required in full-blown trials.
Parties will also be more open to forming their own affirmative action plans in
consent decrees or collective bargaining agreements rather than letting the
courts have absolute control over possible remedies. In light of all of these con-
siderations, settlements are still preferable to trials on the merits. Stotts should
not totally frustrate Title VII's policy of encouraging voluntary settlements
whenever possible."'
CONCLUSION
Affirmative action programs are still viable tools to use to overcome cen-
turies of racial discrimination. The affirmative action preferences and goals of
the last few decades have made great strides in the struggle for racial equality
under the law. The ultimate goals of affirmative action, the reversal of the con-
tinuing effects of discrimination and the opening up of equal opportunities to
all people, have not yet been met, however. Without the continued application
of affirmative action principles, this country will never have equal justice for
all.
10Courts generally hold that findings of discrimination can be satisfied by stipulations in consent decrees or
conciliation agreements. B. SCHLEI AND P. GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 858 (1983).
"I Basic ability requirements tests can be slanted in favor or against any race or class of people. In order for a
standardized test to be valid employment criteria, in the face of a discriminatory impact, the test must "bear
a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
"'But see Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938
(1981) (city admitted past employment discrimination practices and presented abundant evidence of such
discrimination).
'5342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
'15See Last Hired. First Fired, supra note I I I at 243. See also Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action in the
Private Sector - Are Seniority Overrides for Layoffs Permissible? 35 HASTINGS L. 379. 399-400 (1983).
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The Supreme Court sent out mixed signals in Stotts; it appeared to strike a
blow to affirmative action, yet it failed to overrule Weber. The lower courts
have not let this stand in the way of justice, though. The circuit courts have
continued to apply Weber with full force. The Court will have the opportunity
to make a clearer statement about the viability of affirmative action in
Wygant. In order to erase all doubt about the future of affirmative action, the
Court should follow Weber and uphold the Wygant teachers' collectively
bargained for no-layoff contract provision. By doing so, the Court can put
Stotts in its proper perspective and effectively state that affirmative action is
still a proper way to deal with the continuing effects of past injustices caused
by invidious discrimination.
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